Comments of the California Grand Jurors\u27 Association on Professors Vitiello and Kelso\u27s Tentative Recommendation Reform of California Grand Jury Statutes by Association, California Grand Jurors\u27
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-2002
Comments of the California Grand Jurors'
Association on Professors Vitiello and Kelso's
Tentative Recommendation Reform of California
Grand Jury Statutes
California Grand Jurors' Association
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
California Grand Jurors' Association, Comments of the California Grand Jurors' Association on Professors Vitiello and Kelso's Tentative
Recommendation Reform of California Grand Jury Statutes, 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 609 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol35/iss3/1
COMMENTS OF THE CALIFORNIA
GRAND JURORS' ASSOCIATION' ON
PROFESSORS VITIELLO AND KELSO'S
TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION
REFORM OF CALIFORNIA GRAND JURY
STATUTES
In Volume 35, January 2002, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review published an article by Professors Vitiello and Kelso entitled
"Reform of California's Grand Jury System" which concluded "In
the end, the authors believe that California will be best served by
well-trained grand juries that reflect our diverse population." The
California Grand Jurors' Association (CGJA) wholeheartedly agrees
with that conclusion. Professors Vitiello and Kelso have also,
however, released for public comment a series of specific proposed
statutory changes intended, presumably, to implement their thoughts
on reform (http://www.mcgeorge.edu/govemmentlawand_
policy/publications/ccglppubs__grandjurytentative-recommendati
ons.pdf).
Although it agrees wholeheartedly with the authors' ultimate
conclusion quoted above, CGJA disagrees with many of their
specific statutory proposals. The comments which follow are
addressed specifically to those proposals and not to the Professor's
January article.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The overarching concern that the CGJA has with the wide-
ranging reform proposals Professors Vitiello and Kelso released for
public comment is that they should not be introduced as legislation in
1. The California Grand Jurors' Association is a California nonprofit,
public benefit corporation staffed and funded by its volunteer membership. It
is composed of past and present California regular grand jurors. It has no staff
and no external funding.
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their present form. Further, no significant revisions to the statutes
related to the California grand jury system should be proposed
without a consensus of all affected constituents. Those constituents
include: grand jurors, judges, district attorneys, county counsels,
court executive officers, the California State Association of Counties,
the League of California Cities, the California Special Districts
Association, California Statewide Communities Development
Authority, California Society of Municipal Finance Officers,
California Municipal Treasurers' Association, members of the
CGJA, members of independent associations of former grand jurors,
representatives of law enforcement, grand juror trainers, the media,
taxpayers' associations, and the general public.2 The CGJA believes
that the California Judicial Council should create a task force, open
to all affected constituents, for the purpose of studying the possible
need for changes to the grand jury system, and if the need is found to
exist, building a broad and strong consensus on how best to address
it.
Our concern in that regard is prompted by two primary
considerations. First, we think the proposals are not well researched
or fully thought out, and if they were to be adopted in present form,
would cause far more harm than good. Second, and every bit as
important, CGJA recognizes that any comprehensive legislation,
such as these proposals, that does not come to the legislature with a
strong supporting consensus from all, or nearly all, affected interest
groups is subject to being distorted and manipulated through
amendment, often at the last minute and before the true
consequences of such action can be considered. Given how few, in
or out of the legislature, understand the grand jury system, it is quite
possible, indeed in our view even likely, that a reform package that
lacks a compelling consensus will be attacked piecemeal. Such a
2. This list is by no means exhaustive. There are, of course, many
associations and other organizations that represent those with an interest in
grand juries as well as numerous officials and agencies that are the subject of
grand jury oversight, and their organizations. Although some have provided us
with copies of their comments on the Vitiello/Kelso proposals, there may be
many of which we are unaware. See infra note 11. The CGJA notes that the
Califomia Law Revision Commission currently has pending an inquiry relating
to the possible amendment of certain Penal Code sections affecting grand
juries, including section 933, and may be presumed to have some interest in
coordinating amendment proposals.
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reform package would be subject to attack even by the well
intentioned, who are addressing specific concerns advanced by
different interests without consideration of the entire matrix or any
understanding of how an "adjustment" in one section of the code can
affect others. Changes to the grand jury statutes have practical,
financial, legal, and possibly constitutional issues that must be
surfaced, analyzed, and resolved before any effort to legislate change
is initiated. Although the CGJA is focused on the civil function of
grand juries and professes no expertise with respect to the criminal
indictment function, we believe that any changes in the criminal
function must take into account how they might impact the more
common, and we believe more critical, civil function.
3
At the outset, the fundamental relationship between grand juries,
the courts, and the counties needs analysis. Two recent events, one
legislative and one judicial, have created uncertainty and confusion
regarding the funding of grand juries and their continued relationship
with the courts. Any analysis of grand jury reform must start with an
understanding of the implications of the Brown-Presley Trial Court
Funding Act4 and the California Supreme Court decision in Daily
Journal Corp. v. Superior Court.5 Together, these two events seem
to end the traditional role of the grand jury as an "arm of the court"
6
and may eliminate much of the ability of courts to supervise grand
juries in ways other than those expressly provided for by legislation.
Inasmuch as grand jury supervision has historically been viewed as
an inherent authority of the courts, limitations on that authority
would significantly change the day-to-day relationship between
courts and "their" grand juries. This concern is discussed in Section
III and throughout these comments.
3. Indictments appear to be infrequently used in any event. See Bradley v.
Lacy, 53 Cal. App. 4th 883, 893 n.4, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919, 925 n.4 (1997)
(stating that "[i]n California, relatively few prosecutions are commenced by
indictment. The great majority are initiated by information."); see also infra
note 7 (providing CGJA survey results).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 77000-77400 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002)
[hereinafter Trial Court Funding Act]; see also CAL. R. CT. 810 (West 1996)
(regarding costs associated with court operations).
5. 20 Cal. 4th 1117, 979 P.2d 982, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623 (1999).
6. See, e.g., McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1162,
1171, 751 P.2d 1329, 1333, 245 Cal. Rptr. 774, 778 (1988) (stating that "the
grand jury is fundamentally a judicial entity, 'an instrumentality of the courts
of this state"').
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One aspect of California's grand jury system that has
understandably not received much attention is the tremendous
diversity in the practices followed by the fifty-eight counties with
respect to their grand juries. So far as we are aware, the reason this
diversity has gone largely unremarked is because no one has ever
comprehensively surveyed the field. For that reason, the CGJA
recently did so. We sent an eight page written survey to the current
and immediate prior forepersons of all fifty-eight counties' regular
grand juries. We sought detailed information in five areas: (1) grand
jury types and selection processes, (2) orientation and training, (3)
resources, (4) advisors and guidance, and (5) specific grand jury
practices, such as witness admonishment, accusations and final
reports. We have received to date responses from forty-four counties
(seventy-six percent).7 The resulting 352 pages of raw data have
been compiled in summary form and are discussed in section IV of
these comments. As part of our specific statutory comments
discussed below, we make frequent use of the survey results in
analyzing the practical effects of specific code sections as they are
varyingly applied around the state.
Although we firmly believe that it is premature to contemplate
specific legislation before the consequences of the Trial Court
Funding Act and Daily Journal are understood-and in any event
oppose wholesale, wide-sweeping reform in the absence of
substantial consensus-we do offer numerous detailed suggestions
with regard to existing legislation. The statutes governing grand
juries are concededly incomplete, inconsistent and confusing. In
some measure, they have been tolerable because the courts have been
able to work with them using their inherent authority. If that
authority is lost, there will be a need for much work on the statutes.
Based on the experiences of our members (all of whom have been
grand jurors), information we learned at our Annual Conferences and
during our annual training programs, and the results of our recent
grand jury survey, we have commented on the numerous ways in
which existing statutes cause confusion or are inappropriate to the
civil function of today's regular grand juries. We detail those
comments on a statute-by-statute basis in Section V.
7. See CAL. GRAND JURORS' ASS'N, 2001 CALIFORNIA GRAND JURY
PRACTICES SURVEY (Nov. 2001) at http://www.nvo.com/cgia/nss-
folder/onlinepublications2/survey.pdf. [hereinafter SURVEY].
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In the discussion in Section V, we note the existence of many
proposals that would nominally affect only the criminal function of
grand juries and express our concern that they should not be
permitted to weaken or interfere with the civil functions of the
regular grand jury. We specifically object to the proposed
bifurcation of grand jury powers and the mandate that every county
have a standing representative criminal grand jury which might
supplant the regular grand jury.
As the Vitiello/Kelso proposals acknowledge, the CGJA trains
new grand jurors around the state in regional training programs. Our
trainers, all of whom have been grand jurors, have been training new
grand jurors for up to thirteen years, and we feel we understand the
training needs of grand jurors better than anyone else. We discuss
our views on training in Section VI. Although the Vitiello/Kelso
training proposal has no detail sufficient to permit specific comment,
we do question some of its assumptions. We also wonder how the
proposal to create "objective testing procedures" to determine
whether jurors trained in the proposed pilot program "performed
more effectively" than those without training could possibly work.
There is implicit in that notion a view that grand juries, grand jurors,
the situations they investigate, and the expert and legal advice they
receive is much more standardized from county to county than is
actually the case. In any event, although we unequivocally support
the best training for grand jurors, we urge that this aspect of the
Vitiello/Kelso reform package be given far more thought and
analysis than the proposal currently reflects.
With the caveat that we do not advocate any grand jury reform
being proposed to the legislature which has not resulted from a
broad, deep and strong consensus of all constituents, in Section VII
we suggest five areas which, if legislation were to be proposed, we
believe should be addressed. Regular grand juries should be
provided better access to independent counsel. They should be
provided with access to technology on par with the technology
available to those they oversee. Careful reconsideration of the
confidentiality rules as they apply to the civil function of the grand
jury is called for. Minimum training standards should be developed,
and we offer our view that doing so is an apt function for the
Administrative Office of the Courts. Consideration should be given
to requiring each county to have an "Implementation Review
AUril 2002]
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Committee" to review whether or not grand jury recommendations,
the implementation of which has been agreed to by the affected
agency or official, have in fact been implemented.
Finally, we conclude by urging the California Judicial Council
to convene a task force on grand jury reform so that the broad, deep,
and strong consensus we believe is so important in this area can be
forged.
II. INTRODUCTION
The burden of our comments is that it is folly at best, and
dangerous devilment at worst, to propose a sweeping reform of the
California grand jury system without first:
- understanding the legal penumbra under which the grand jury
system operates, which is, at best, unclear at the present time;
• understanding how the fifty-eight grand juries actually
function in their respective counties-information that, to the best of
our knowledge, has nct previously been systematically compiled by
anyone at any time, and;
- involving, at the earliest stage of consideration, all interested
parties under the guidance and direction of an informed, neutral
agency capable of receiving and digesting the input of many different
constituents.
We discuss the legal penumbra and its uncertain state first, in the
hope and expectation that anyone seriously advocating grand jury
reform will devote the resources and expertise necessary to clarify
those uncertainties before, or at least as part of, any effort at reform.
We then discuss the absence of any institutionalized
understanding of how grand juries actually function and what they
actually accomplish. We describe the results of a recent CGJA
study, which we believe to be the only one of its kind,8 that
demonstrates wide diversity among grand jury practices and the need
for a comprehensive, authoritative study by an appropriate
government agency to generate credible data sufficient to show how
8. The Vitiello/Kelso proposals reference an unidentified 1996 study
without specifically addressing what the study covers. CGJA requested a copy
of, or citation to, that study from Professors Vitiello and Kelso, but has
received no response. We cannot know therefore what the nature of the study
was.
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grand juries actually operate. 9 So far as we are aware, no one, at any
time, has done a meaningful study of what the costs and financial
benefits of the California grand jury are. Costs are reasonably
estimable, but benefits are not. We suggest that if any
comprehensive reform package gets to the California Legislature, the
legislature is sure to ask the question: What does the grand jury cost
and what benefit does it provide? It would, in our view, be
irresponsible to bring the proposed sweeping reform to the
legislature without having an answer to that question. We suggest
that developing an answer will be a difficult and time consuming job,
perhaps best conducted as a funded study by a grantor interested in
better government. 10 We suggest that this is something that the
Administrative Office of the Courts, the administrative arm of the
California Judicial Council, is uniquely well positioned to
administer.
Assuming that a serious discussion and consideration of possible
reform will ensue, we note below the most apparent deficiencies in
the existing statutes pertaining to grand juries and suggest
corrections that we believe are necessary before those statutes are
incorporated in a reform package. In the course of that discussion,
we note our concerns about the sweep of the separate "criminal"
grand jury and the "right to counsel" proposals which are part of the
reform package. For historic, constitutional and operational reasons,
9. It should go without saying, but under the circumstances we. feel
compelled to say, that it borders on the irresponsible to justify a grand jury
"reform" effort on the basis of press coverage of two, and only two, instances
of alleged grand jury error, one of which was, if error at all, error by the district
attorney and not by the grand jury, and the other of which at most demonstrates
how vulnerable a grand jury can be to error if it is not guided by independent,
competent legal advisors. Each year California's fifty-eight regular grand
juries return dozens of indictments and issue hundreds of reports critical of
various aspects of local government. That Professors Vitiello and Kelso could
find but two instances of alleged error speaks volumes for the integrity and
efficacy of the grand jury.
10. It would appear that the Vitiello/Kelso proposals agree with this view.
At page eleven of the grand jury Background Study, the authors note the
absence of any meaningful study of the costs and benefits of the civil oversight
function of the regular grand jury and note: "Such a study is beyond resources
available to the author(s) of this report." Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso,
Grand Jwy Background Study (Apr. 18, 2001), available at http:l
www.mcgeorge.edu/govermnent-law and policy/institute _legislativepractice
/grandjuryreform__project.htm.
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we oppose a standing "criminal" grand jury. The expertise and
interest of the CGJA is in the civil oversight role of the regular grand
jury. As such, we have no position on the question of whether a
target of a criminal investigation by a grand jury, led by a district
attorney in consideration of a possible indictment, is wise or unwise.
We do have serious concerns that the language of any such provision
be carefully drawn so that the right to have counsel present does not
impact the civil setting, including the accusation function and
investigations of noncriminal targets.'
As the primary independent training agency for grand jurors in
the state, we also comment generally on the training proposal
advanced by Professors Vitiello and Kelso, and express our
reservations regarding the efficacy of attempting to utilize state-
sponsored career training techniques to train short-term volunteers
whose value lies in their independence from the state.
As proponents of AB 607, which amended Penal Code section
904.6 in 1991 to authorize any county to impanel, on an as-needed
basis, an additional, demographically representative, grand jury to
handle only criminal matters, we explain why the Vitiello/Kelso
proposal that every county must have such a grand jury, perhaps to
the exclusion of its regular grand jury, is unwise, potentially
unconstitutional and financially unsound.
Finally we advance suggested areas for affirmative additions to
the existing statutory scheme that we believe should be made if any
reform legislation is introduced.
III. THE GRAND JURY' S PRESENT UNCERTAIN ROLE IN THE
GOVERNMENTAL SCHEME
No proposal to reform the California grand jury will be useful
unless it initially takes into account the limbo into which the grand
jury has recently been thrust, however unintentionally. Conversely,
any proposal to reform the grand jury system which does not take the
current ambiguous situation of the grand juries into account will be
ill-advised and potentially dangerous to the grand jury system.
11. Others knowledgeable about and interested in the grand jury system in
California have already provided comments to Professors Vitiello and Kelso,
and they tend to oppose many features of the proposals, including the right to
counsel feature.
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This is so because for almost 150 years 12 the grand jury, both
criminal and civil, has functioned as an arm of the court and judicial
supervision and oversight have provided the putty and paint which
covered the many gaps and distortions that would otherwise be
apparent from the inadequate, often inconsistent, legislation
addressed to grand juries.
One can, but need not at the present time, have a significant
debate over the extent to which the legislature, or the courts for that
matter, can alter certain time-honored characteristics of the grand
jury-characteristics the continuation of which arguably were
endorsed and adopted by the people when they adopted California's
Constitution and thereby mandated the yearly existence of grand
juries in all counties.
13
What does need to be addressed at the outset of any discussion
about reform, however, is who has what authority to reform the
grand jury. CGJA does not have the resources to provide a properly
researched and analyzed answer to that question, but it can
confidently advance the proposition that whoever wishes to reform
the grand jury must undertake that research and analysis to be
effective, indeed, to avoid being dangerous.
The problem, in a nutshell, is that in the relatively recent past the
grand jury's historical underpinnings have been, perhaps
unintentionally, weakened by both the legislature and the California
Supreme Court. Until fairly recently, grand juries were consistently
12. See Michael Vitiello & J. Clark Kelso, Reform of California's Grand
Jury System, 35 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 513, 515 (2001).
13. See, e.g., Fitts v. Superior Ct., 6 Cal. 2d 230, 240-41 (1936) ("The
Constitution of 1879 did not attempt to change the historic character of the
grand jury and the system [the Constitutional Convention's] members had in
mind was evidently the same system that had come down to them from the
common law. It is in no sense a statutory grand jury distinguished from the
common-law grand jury as claimed by the respondent.... We must conclude,
therefore, that the Constitution of 1879 when it refers to the grand jury refers to
it as it had always been known and understood prior thereto."). Long before
the California Constitution mandated the presence in each county of a "grand
jury," those words were known to describe a body that functioned as a civic
watchdog: overseeing government, criticizing officials, publicizing concerns
and compelling public officials to make corrections, suggesting new legislation
and representing the people of the community. See Stephanie A. Doria,
Comment, Adding Bite to the Watchdog's Bark: Reforming the California
Grand Jury System, 28 PAc. L.J. 1115, 1120 (1997), and authorities cited
therein.
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viewed to be "arms of the court" and the superior courts, which
impaneled and "supervised" the grand juries, used their inherent
authority to fill in the gaps created by the minimal, and often
confusing, legislative guidance provided by the grand jury statutes.
Just as the courts themselves, as independent constitutionally created
agencies have certain inherent authority, so too did the grand jury as
an agency of the court. Similarly, just as the legislature is
empowered to enact legislation affecting certain aspects of the
court's operations 14 it has enacted certain statutory guidelines for
grand juries as well. 5
The statutes have been incomplete,' 6 inconsistent17  and
confusing 18 for decades, but there has been little adverse
consequence to the operation of grand juries because the courts, and
the grand juries' other legal advisors, have "made up" the rules as
they went along. This has worked acceptably, and it is this system of
patchwork statutes, infrequent appellate guidance, and frequent
judicial intervention at the local level that has given us the system
that many today say "isn't broken and doesn't need fixing."
Arguably, the primary disadvantage of this ad hoc system is that it
permits, perhaps even encourages, tremendous diversity in the way
the fifty-eight grand juries operate. Given the diversity of the
counties, their resources, demographics, and needs, CGJA is not
persuaded that such diversity is necessarily bad. Certainly anyone
advocating reform on the statewide level must address the issue
whether it makes sense to have the same operating rules, for
14. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 68070-76000 (West 1997) ("The
Organization and Government of Courts").
15. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 888-939.91 (West 1985 & Supp. 2000)
("Grand Jury Proceedings").
16. As discussed hereafter, for example, admonitions of confidentiality are
provided for interpreters and minors' support persons but not for the witnesses
themselves. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 939.11, 939.21 (West 1985 & Supp.
2000).
17. As discussed hereafter, for example, the oath given to a regular grand
juror requires that the jurist pledge to investigate crimes (which the jurist may,
in fact, be told he or she cannot do) but says nothing about government
oversight, the primary function the jurist will have. Compare CAL. PENAL
CODE § 911 with § 914.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
18. As discussed below, for example, there is much confusion among the
counties as to what constitutes a "public prison" as that term is used in
California Penal Code sections 919 and 921.
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example, for Alpine County with a population of 1,200 people, and
Los Angeles County with a population of 9.5 million people and
more government than many states and countries have. To form that
judgment requires a more informed understanding about what is
actually happening than we believe anyone currently possesses.
CGJA has begun the process of collecting relevant information, but
much more needs to be done and the weight of official agencies must
be brought to bear.
But even if those considering reform come to understand what,
factually, they are proposing to reform, there remains the question of
what the legal status of the grand jury is and what the parameters of
permissible reform are. Although, to repeat, CGJA is not in a
position to provide--or, with its limited resources even to
undertake-a comprehensive legal analysis, we urge that anyone
advocating sweeping reform is intellectually obliged to do so, and we
suggest the following as a broad outline to guide that analysis.
For over 100 years the California courts regularly pronounced
that grand juries were "judicial bodies," "instrumentalit[ies] of the
court," and "arm[s] of the courts," all without specific regard to
whether the grand jury was performing a criminal or civil function.
19
This recognition that grand juries had a special role vis-a-vis the
courts gave rise to a judicial involvement with grand juries that far
exceeded anything expressly contemplated by the statutes. One
example should suffice to make the point. Although the legislature
has specifically provided that grand jurors, interpreters, and minors'
support persons must maintain confidentiality,20 it made no such
provision for witnesses. Nonetheless, CGJA's survey has found that
80% of regular grand juries admonish witnesses to maintain
confidentiality, no doubt with the blessing and probable
encouragement of their "supervising" courts which, perhaps wisely,
have seen a legislative void and have stepped in to fill it. Indeed, the
Attorney General as early as 1983 issued an opinion validating this
practice and even opining that courts could enforce jury-administered
19. See, e.g., People v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 3d 430, 438-39, 531 P.2d 761,
766-67, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193, 198-200 (1975) (and cases cited therein) Board of
Ret. v. Santa Barbara County Grand Jury, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1188, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 607, 610 (1997).
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 911, 933.11, 939.21 (West 1985 & Supp.
2001).
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admonitions by contempt of court proceedings.21 Whether or not the
legislature should provide for such admonitions and enforcement is
beside the present point. The point is that courts have long felt they
had inherent authority to guide and assist "their" grand juries in ways
such as this.
All that began to change in 1988 with the legislature's passage
of the Brown-Presley Trial Court Funding Act which, inter alia,
excluded grand juries from the definition of "trial court operations."
Apparently in response to that Act, in July 1988 the California
Judicial Council, which oversees the courts, promulgated California
Rule of Court 810.22 That rule, which is binding on the superior
courts which used to oversee grand juries, excludes from "court
operations" "civil and criminal grand jury expenses and operations
(except selection)., 23 Pursuant to Rule 810(c), costs for civil and
criminal grand jury expenses and operations (except selection) "are
unallowable. 24
With no fanfare, and so far as CGJA has been able to determine,
no comment by anyone representing the interests of grand juries,
funding for this hitherto arm of the court became "unallowable."
Then, without even referencing this legislative development, the
California Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in 1999 that,
although dealing with a very narrow issue, can be read to support the
proposition that, except in special cases to be defined by the supreme
court in the future, superior courts do not have inherent authority
over "their" grand juries, but rather have only the authority the
legislature gives them. 5 This is intellectually consistent with a prior
21. See 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 85 (1983).
22. CAL. R. CT. § 810 (West 1996).
23. CAL. R. CT. § 810(b)(6) (West 1996).
24. An interesting development that should lead to a complete reanalysis of
grand jury funding is the potential that an initiative may appear on the
November 2002 ballot which, if passed, would create a "State" grand jury,
composed of thirteen regional jury panels of twenty-three jurors paid up to
$100,000 each. Without even considering the cost of training, transportation,
lodging, investigations, staff, etc., the cost of that grand jury could be at least
$29,000,000. The initiative in its present form would require that the cost of
that grand jury "be paid from funds appropriated in the Budget Act for the
support of the judiciary." In other words, that grand jury, unlike the current
grand juries, would be an expense of the courts. See Initiative SA200IRFOO26
(2002), available at http://caag.state.ca.us/initiatives/activeindex.htm.
25. See Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior. Ct., 20 Cal. 4th 1117, 1133-34, 979
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position taken by the California Supreme Court in 1988, and heavily
relied upon in the 1999 decision, to the effect that the grand juries
themselves have no inherent powers, only those granted to them by
the legislature.
26
Two current examples, selected from many, illustrate the
potential confusion and uncertainty surrounding the status of
California grand juries today. In 1998, the presiding judge of the
Santa Clara Superior Court "dissolved" a seated grand jury on the
grounds that it was dysfunctional as a result of a divisive split among
the members.27 No doubt the presiding judge felt he had the power
to do so as part of his inherent powers. But in light of the supreme
court's Daily Journal2 8 decision, he may have been powerless to
discharge the jury. Once, a court had the authority to discharge a
grand jury at any time "in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
'2 9
However, more recently the legislature has given courts statutory
authority to discharge grand juries only "on the completion of the
business before the grand jury" or on the expiration of its term.
30
Arguably then, because the legislature has spoken to the issue of jury
discharge and has given the court only limited ability to act, under
the reasoning of Daily Journal3 1 the court lacks the ability to
discharge a dysfunctional panel. Obviously any reform must take
into account such novel factors as the possibility that a court can no
longer discharge a jury, or a juror, or otherwise seek to involve itself
with the grand jury absent express legislative authorization to do so.
A different circumstance demonstrates the same uncertainty now
.surrounding the grand jury's role. In 2001, the legislature amended
P.2d 982, 992-93, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623, 633-35 (1999).
26. See McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1162, 751 P.2d
1329, 245 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1988). The McClatchy view is, however, at odds
with the concept of a "common-law" grand jury articulated by the supreme
court in Fitts. See Fitts v. Superior Ct., 6 Cal. 2d 230, 231, 57 P.2d 509, 510
(The supreme court has never expressly disavowed the Fitts articulation of the
common law status of grand juries as envisioned by the citizenry when the
1879 Constitution was adopted).
27. See Sandra Gonzalez, Judge Dissolves Grand Jury Unprecedented:
Dissidents Are Blamed For Split in Civil Panel, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Dec. 30, 1998, at Al.
28. 20 Cal. 4th. 1117.
29. Inre Gannon, 69 Cal. 541,547, 11 P. 240,242 (1886).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 915 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
31. See 20 Cal. 4th at 1123.
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Penal Code section 890 to increase pay and mileage for grand
jurors. However, the section, as amended, continues to provide for
payment to grand jurors of mileage "for each mile actually traveled
in attending court as a grand juror."33 Proposed Government Code
section 77811 in the Vitiello/Kelso proposal uses the same
"attending court as a grand juror" language.34 Both the legislature, at
least in this instance, and Vitiello/Kelso seem to continue to view the
grand jury as an arm of the court.35 As noted above, it may well no
longer enjoy that status and, suffice to say, most grand jurors do not
"attend court" in their capacities as jurors. Indeed, according to
CGJA's survey, 54% of grand juries meet in nonjudicial facilities,
which is consistent with the import of the Trial Court Funding Act's
exclusion of grand juries from court operations. 36 There can be no
doubt, however, that the legislature and Vitiello/Kelso intended
mileage to be paid for travel to grand jury meetings whether or not
held in court. The problem we seek to highlight is that each made
their recommendations in apparent ignorance of the changing footing
of the grand jury. We hope adequate research and analysis will
avoid similar mistakes should any reform proposal be presented to
the legislature.
In short, no discussion of grand jury reform is likely to be
meaningful until the proponents come to grips with the uncertainties
created by the dichotomy between long standing notions of the role
of the grand jury in our Constitutional system and the new, possibly
unintended, orphaned status of the grand jury. In our opinion, when,
and only when, such an analysis is completed will it be opportune to
even initiate any discussion about the wisdom of undertaking
wholesale reform of the grand jury system. We believe it is also
essential to that analysis that it include a careful and detailed look at
how the fifty-eight regular grand juries are actually funded. To assist
32. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 890 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002).
33. Id.
34. Michael Vitiello & J. Clark Kelso, Tentative Recommendation-Reform
of California Grand Jury Statutes (April 18, 2001) available at
http://mcgeorge.edu/govemmentlaw andpolicy/publications/cglppubsgra
ndjurytentative-recommendations.pdf [hereinafter Tentative
Recommendation].
35. Id.
36. SURVEY, supra note 7.
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in starting that analysis we discuss below the results of our recently
conducted survey of regular grand juries.
IV. RESULTS OF CGJA's SURVEY OF GRAND JURY PRACTICES
37
In June 2001, the CGJA surveyed the current and immediately
prior forepersons of California's fifty-eight county grand juries
relative to approximately 100 grand jury practices.3 To date, forty-
four of California's counties (76%) have responded to our survey.
39
Our survey represents the first comprehensive look at California's
grand juries in recent times. Some 352 pages of raw data have now
been compiled into a twenty-page statistical report of current grand
jury practices.
40
A. Grand Jury Types and Selection Processes
An optional additional grand jury dedicated to hearing criminal
matters supplements the regular grand jury in 48% of California's
counties. Criminal grand juries are used frequently in four heavily
populated counties, while rural counties may use a criminal grand
jury one or two times a year.4' Indictment activity by regular grand
juries is rare, with only five counties reporting indictments in the last
two years.
42
Volunteers are the only source of candidates for the regular
grand jury in 55% of the counties; while 18% of the counties use
petit jury rolls; and 9% use nominees of court, government, or
community leaders as their source of candidates. Remaining
counties use split sources of candidates. Also, six counties reported
difficulty in finding sufficient candidates to impanel their grand jury
and in each case additional volunteers resolved the problem.
43
37. This section relates and interprets some of the critical findings of
CGJA's 2001 California Grand Jury Practices Survey. See id. At times, the
language may be taken directly from the Survey.
38. See id.
39. All percentage references resulting from the survey are based on the
forty-four counties responding to the survey.
40. SURVEY, supra note 7.
41. See SURVEY, supra note 7.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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Juror carryovers from one jury to the next are very common and
were found in 86% of the counties. The number of carryovers
ranged from one to eight."
B. Grand Jury Orientation and Training
Orientation and/or training for a new grand jury are almost
universal and found in 98% of the counties reporting. The one
county reporting no training does allow the foreperson to attend
CGJA training. Training is conducted during the first eight weeks of
a new jury term in 52% of the counties, while 16% conduct training
immediately prior to the jury's term. Remaining counties report a
combination of training times.
45
Former grand jurors, in the form of CGJA, local juror
associations, and as individuals, are involved in 90% of the training
conducted. County counsel is involved in 59%, the district attorney
in 50%, and outside professional paid trainers are reported in 30% of
the county programs. 
4 6
Our survey questioned respondents on twelve training
components. Common components used in 55% of the counties
were grand jury Authority & Law, Juror Conduct, Investigations, and
Interviewing. Another 16% used at least three of the common
components identified by our survey results. Hours spent on
individual training components varied from thirty minutes to six
hours, with investigations and interviewing typically receiving higher
amounts of time. Foreperson training was significantly lacking, with
less than 10% reporting any training of their forepersons.
47
All but one county reported issuance of a jury handbook
annually, with most updates done by the sitting grand jury.48
C. Grand Jury Resources
Annual grand jury Budgets varied widely from $5,200 in a rural
county to $1,233,000 in California's largest county with a median of
$55,328 for the 36 counties submitting budget information. In less
populated rural counties, 33%, reported budgets of less than $35,000;
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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while in California's more populated counties, 33%, reported
budgets in the range of $100,000 to $432,592; excluding the Los
Angeles County budget.
49
Sixty-six percent of the counties have dedicated and secure
grand jury rooms, usually within court or county buildings. Grand
juries without dedicated rooms meet in a wide variety of locations
such as public libraries, spare court jury rooms, hospitals, city
council chambers, and agricultural offices. The size of meeting
rooms varied from 128 square feet to a complex of meeting rooms
and offices covering 4,000 square feet.
50
Fifty-seven percent of the grand juries receive some form of
staff support from either court or county personnel. 5 1 The amount of
support usually has a direct relationship to the county's population
and ranges from thirty minutes a week to a full-time administrator or
secretary.
5 2
Equipment resources for grand juries vary widely with 64%
having at least a computer, telephone, and copier. Unfortunately,
seven counties, or 15%, report not even having a telephone, while a
large number report no computer or copier available.5 3
Grand jury use of outside personnel resources was very limited
with 11% using independent counsel, 18% using auditors, and 27%
using outside experts.
5 4
D. Grand Jury Advisors and Guidance
Our survey asked respondents to identify, by ranking, their
primary legal advisors5 5 Approximately one-half, 51% ranked their
judge as primary, 42% ranked county counsel as primary, and 7%
listed their district attorney as primary advisor to the grand jury.5 6 A
third (32%) of the counties reported having a legal advisor recused
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Although not on the survey, we are aware anecdotally that where courts
provide services they usually charge the counties for the cost due to the Trial
Court Funding Act and Rule 810.
52. See SURVEY, supra note 7.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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for a conflict of interest. Only 23% reported their court having a
policy on recusals.
57
Court instructions to the grand jury varied significantly with
68% receiving instruction that jury deliberations are restricted only
to grand jurors; 43% receiving instruction, mainly in the form of a
juror's handbook, on how to handle accusations; 36% receiving
instruction on use of independent counsel; and 27% receiving
instruction on how to handle responses to a final report.5
8
Legal advisor response time to grand jury requests varied from
immediate to a disheartening ninety days. Sixty-four percent of
those responding reported response time of one week or less and
25% reported immediate response.
59
Our survey contained seven 2uestions on legal advisor
involvement in grand jury activities. Most responses revealed
limited involvement, except county counsel previewing final reports
in approximately 50% of the counties, and a few isolated practices of
court personnel opening mail without authority or suggesting topics
for investigations.
61
E. Specific Grand Jury Practices
"Issuance of accusations was rare with only five counties
reporting accusations in recent years. One accusation was reported
as sustained.,
62
"Admonishment of witnesses was common and reported by 80%
of the counties but no one reported any Court action for a witness
violating an admonishment." 63
Most (64%) of the grand juries issued multiple final reports 64
during the course of their terms.
65
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. These are often, and unfortunately misleadingly, referred to as "interim
reports" with the consequence that some respondents purport to be uncertain
whether they are "final reports" as to which the time to respond has started to
elapse.
65. See SURVEY, supra note 7.
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Grand Jury final report actions. revealed [that] 82% issue [Penal
Code section] 933 instructions and 91% use a transmittal letter sent,
usually, by the Foreperson. Named respondents are directed to send
their responses to the Court in 77% of the counties while Grand
Juries are left to determine legality of a response in 52% of the
counties. In 48% of the counties, the Court issues a letter or order
when a respondent fails to respond to a Grand Jury's final report.
66
Final reports are published on the Internet by 64% of the grand
juries and 39% also publish the responses to final reports.
67
Clearly there is a great. deal of variation among the regular grand
juries, even with respect to matters nominally covered, and therefore
presumably standardized, by the governing statutes. Those statutes
are discussed below.
V. INDIVIDUAL STATUTES
CGJA does not support broad reform of the type currently
proposed. Certainly CGJA opposes the legislative introduction of
any such reform package not preceded by substantial additional
thought and significant and varied constituent input. Against the
possibility that such a reform package is introduced, however, we
comment on the specifics of some of the statutes that would be
affected by the proposed reform. First, we are concerned that, in the
course of their legislative transposition, they may be changed in
well-intentioned, but harmful, ways. Second, those that are not
changed may unintentionally create a misapprehension as to the
legislature's intent. Specifically, for many of the statutes, the only
reform presently suggested is that they be moved to the Government
Code. However, many of these statutes are flawed in ways that
grand juries have learned to work around. As stated previously,
many of the statutes are incomplete, inconsistent, and confusing and
do not comport with the effects of the Trial Court Funding Act or the
Daily Journal decision. To simply readopt them now as part of a
relocation to the Government Code would imply that such a state of
affairs is desirable. This is so because such readoption would likely
be viewed as constituting legislative ratification of their flaws
because courts presume that the legislature knows what it is doing.
66. Id.
67. See id.
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Consequently, we make the comments below in the hope that if the
legislature is asked to act, it will in fact know what the consequences
of its actions will be.
We identify the statutes on which we have comments by their
present section numbers in the codes and, if they are the subjects of
new citations proposed by Professors Vitiello and Kelso, follow with
that citation. Statutes not mentioned are omitted intentionally. At
the outset, however, we wish unequivocally to state that we oppose
transferring any current Penal Code provisions relating to grand
juries to the Government Code. Grand juries are not agencies of
government; they are the means by which citizens have expressly
retained unto themselves the right to oversee government. The
power to investigate and initiate prosecution for crimes (indictment)
has always been an integral component of the regular grand jury's
function. Even if the ill-conceived suggestion of a mandatory
criminal grand jury proposed by section 77853 is deleted,68
relocating grand jury functions from the Penal Code to the
Government Code is sure to cast doubt on the continued efficacy of
the regular grand jury's criminal functions and lead to confusion and
litigation in an area where matters are, and long have been, settled.
PENAL CODE SECTION 889; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77804-INDICTMENT: 69 Although the Vitiello/Kelso report
states that this section has no derivation,7" it is in fact taken verbatim
from Penal Code section 889. The use of the word "accusation" in
the definition of an indictment causes unnecessary confusion. As
long ago as 1904, the California Supreme Court made it clear that an
"accusation is not an indictment, and is not to be treated as such.",7 1
We suggest that the term "accusation" be replaced with "a statement
of the public offense or offenses charged therein."
72
68. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 19.
69. See id. at 10.
70. See id.
71. In re Burleigh, 145 Cal. 35, 36, 78 P. 242, 242 (1904) (noting that the
accusation was apparently intended to be similar to articles of impeachment);
see also Edson v. Superior Ct., 98 Cal. App. 367, 372, 277 P. 194, 196 (1929)
(stating that an accusation to remove a public officer for misconduct need not
be drawn with particularity of indictment).
72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 950 (West 1985).
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PENAL CODE SECTION 890; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77811-FEES: 73 Our concern regarding the implications of
the "attending court" language and the "arm of court" historical basis
for the term is discussed supra.74 We believe mileage rates should
be materially higher than $0.29 per mile, one way, and that there is
need for greater clarity as to what trips, where, and for what purpose,
create a mileage entitlement. In many counties, particularly those
that are very large, or in smaller, but mountainous, counties with
poor road coverage, mileage may be far more important than per
diems, and mileage rates may well limit diversity. The recent
passage of Assembly Bill 1161, which increases the minimums for
grand juror pay and mileage may, in any event, have rendered this
proposed revision moot.
75
PENAL CODE SECTION 890.1; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77812-PAYMENT OF FEES: 76 As discussed previously, we
believe the Trial Court Funding Act77 itself, and its practical
implications, must be reconsidered as part of any meaningful
analysis of grand jury reform. This would include a careful
reconsideration of which "jurors" are a court expense, which are a
county expense, and whether it makes sense to shift all grand juror
costs to the counties.
PENAL CODE SECTION 893; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77830-COMPETENCY: 78 Penal Code section 893(a)(2) is a
good example of a statute79 that, although flawed, has not been a
problem but which, if readopted by transposing it to a different code,
might become problematic. At present, grand jurors are
"discharged" at the end of their term and courts have no express
authority to "discharge" one or more jurors other than on the
completion of their business or term.80  Section 893(2)/77830(2)
would therefore prohibit "carry-over" grand jurors.
We are aware anecdotally that many courts "screen" their
prospective grand jurors against criteria over and above those set
73. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 10-11.
74. See supra Section III.
75. SeeAB 1161, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).
76. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 11.
77. See Trial Court Funding Act, supra note 4.
78. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 14.
79. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 893(a)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
80. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 915 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
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forth in this section and section 903.2. If, as a result of the Trial
Court Funding Act and Daily Journal,81 courts do not have inherent
authority over grand juries, we question the legitimacy of engaging
in such unauthorized screening. The practice should be either
expressly permitted or expressly prohibited.
PENAL CODE SECTION 896-SELEcTION: See comments to
section 893.
PENAL CODE SECTION 901(a); PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77845-SERVICE: 82 There is occasional confusion whether
a grand jury's term ends at the end of twelve months or only when a
new jury is impaneled. Case law provides that it continues until a
new jury is impaneled. 3 The statute should clearly so state.
PENAL CODE SECTION 903.2; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77842-POTENTIAL JURORS: See comments to section 893.
PENAL CODE SECTION 903.3; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77843-SELECTION OF JURORS: See comments to section
893.
PENAL CODE SECTION 903.4; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77844-DISREGARD LIST: See comments to section 893.
PENAL CODE SECTION 904.4 AND 904.6; PROPOSED
GOVERNMENT CODE SECTIONS 77822, 77823, 77850, 77851, 77853,
77854 AND 77940-ADDITIONAL GRAND JURY:84 We see no need for
such a body. Furthermore, we have serious concerns about the
constitutionality of requiring that, if a county wishes to have only
one grand jury it must be the "representative" criminal grand jury,
which would then also exercise civil oversight functions. Although
others are obviously better positioned than we are to do a
comprehensive study of this issue, our analysis indicates that the
1974 amendment to Article 1, section 23 of the California
Constitution was not intended to change the character of the basic,
regular grand jury in any way, but only to permit the creation of
limited jurisdiction, "representative" criminal grand juries in addition
to, and not in lieu of, regular grand juries.
81. See AB 233, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997); Daily Journal Corp. v.
Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 4th 1117, 979 P.2d 982, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623 (1999).
82. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 17.
83. See People v. Bonelli, 50 Cal. 2d 190, 324 P.2d 1 (1958); Halsey v.
Superior Ct., 152 Cal. 71, 91 P. 987 (1907).
84. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 12-39.
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Specifically, Proposition 7, adopted in 1974, amended the
Constitution to provide, as it now does, for "[o]ne or more" grand
juries.85 Previously, the Constitution had required that each county
have "[a] grand jury." The grand jury referred to was, of course, the
dual purpose common law grand jury recognized by the supreme
court in Fitts v. Superior Court.8 6  The voters' pamphlet that
accompanied Proposition 7 makes no mention of a possible change
in grand juror makeup from the existing "select" membership to a
"representative" one. 87 Indeed, the only reference to the grand jury
in the entire pamphlet says: "Presently the Constitution requires
each county to summon a grand jury once each year. Without
changing that requirement, this proposition allows the Legislature to
provide for summoning more than one grand jury each year."
88
Proposition 7 itself resulted from constitutional amendments
recommended in 1970 by the California Constitution Revision
Commission,89 specifically including the language that is now
Article 1, section 23.90 A review of the minutes of the commission's
meetings in 1969 and 1970 reveals that various proposals to require
any grand juries to be "representative" were defeated. 9' The
recommendations of the commission, transmitted to the Joint
Committee on Rules in January 1971, include commentary on'the
language which is now Article 1, section 23.92 That commentary
makes clear that there was no intent to change the regular grand
jury's composition to a "representative" one: "The criminal
indictment function suggests that the grand jury be composed of a
broad cross-section of the community. The governmental
investigation function, on the other hand, is best discharged by
persons having a more sophisticated knowledge of accounting and
85. California Voter's Pamphlet, Proposition 7 (1974).
86. 6 Cal. 2d 230, 240-41, 57 P.2d 510, 514-15 (1996).
87. See California Voter's Pamphlet, supra note 85.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. See CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, PROPOSED
REVISION OF ARTICLE, ARTICLE XX, AND ARTICLE XXII OF THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION (1971).
90. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 23.
91. See MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE CONSTITUTION REVISION
COMMISSION (1970).
92. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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administration." 93  We conclude that it is likely that moving the
"governmental investigation function" from the regular grand jury to
a "representative" grand jury would be unconstitutional.
Whether unconstitutional or not, there is simply no need for the
mandatory criminal grand jury being proposed. The optional
criminal grand jury, currently provided for by Penal Code section
904.6, is adequate to meet any need prosecutors may have to obtain
indictments and to avoid interfering with a regular grand jury's civil
oversight function,94 at minimal expense to the counties.95  We
suggest that Penal Code sections 904.4 and 904.6 be melded so that,
for example, the section 904.4 grand jury, like the 904.6 grand jury,
would have to be composed of a "reasonably representative" cross
section of the relevant population. We also strongly recommend that
language be added to make clear that a regular grand jury may refuse
to hear a criminal matter if an additional grand jury may be appointed
to do so. We note here that this is but a minor statutory adjustment
and in no way affects our broad views on the propriety of creating
parallel, or even exclusive, criminal grand juries in all counties, for
all criminal matters, and depriving regular grand juries of their
ancillary criminal powers. Nor does it affect our view, discussed
below, that the right to have counsel present in criminal
investigations, whatever it may prove to be, be very clearly and
carefully distinguished from civil investigations, including
accusations, where no right to counsel presently exists.
93. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 89, at
22.
94. See SURVEY, supra note 7; supra section IV. According to our survey,
regular grand juries handle very few indictments, which leaves them free to
pursue their civil oversight function, and indicates a lack of need for a
mandatory standing criminal grand jury. See supra Section IV; California
Grand Jurors' Association, 2001 California Grand Jury Practices Survey
(2001), available at http://www.nvo.com/cgja/nss-folder/onlinepublications2/
survey.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2002).
95. We note that our opposition to a separate standing criminal grand jury is
consistent with the determination of the Los Angeles County Citizens'
Economy and Efficiency Commission. In its July 2001 publication "Review of
the Effectiveness of the Los Angeles County Grand Jury," this commission
concluded an analysis of Los Angeles' ongoing experiment with two grand
juries, one criminal and one regular, by recommending a prompt return to a
single, regular grand jury. Counties which wanted to use a representative
grand jury for criminal purposes would of course have the ability to do so
pursuant to Penal Code section 904.6.
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CGJA also questions what benefit would be served by so
distorting the historic grand jury function and character. In a speech
at CGJA's 2000 Annual Conference, Judge Quentin Kopp, who
indicated that he himself had given some thought to revising some
aspects of grand jury functions, most notably the secrecy
requirement, stated that he had been informed by the California
District Attorney's Association that only 2% of criminal actions were
initiated by indictment. 96 As noted, CGJA's survey reveals that
indictments are very infrequently sought in all but four counties.
97
On the face of such paucity of demand for grand jury indictments,
can it make sense to rip so deeply into the bowels of the organism in
the untested hope of successfully performing a radical operation of
so little benefit? Here, more than anywhere else in the proposed
scheme, we find ourselves echoing and endorsing our brethren who
so frequently responded to these proposals by saying: "It ain't
broke; don't fix it!"
PENAL CODE (NONE); PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION
77853-INDICTMENTS/REPRESENTATIVE GRAND JURY REQUIRED:
98
This would appear to be a matter involving the criminal role of a
grand jury and, to that extent, we have no comment on the wisdom of
using an optional "representative" grand jury to "issue indictments."
We would urge great clarity, however, to avoid unintended
implications. First, we see no need to attempt to strip the regular
grand jury of its constitutional right to indict. That such an
indictment might be flawed by reason of the jury's makeup is a factor
for the prosecutor and jury to consider in the exercise of discretion.
We are aware of no reason a regular grand jury could not validly
indict if it was in fact representative, regardless of the procedures
used to impanel it. So too, we are unaware of any reason why a
district attorney, having an indictment in hand, could not elect to
proceed by way of preliminary hearing so as to avoid any potential
taint from the composition of the indicting grand jury. We do not
oppose the use of a section 904.6 grand jury where needed to avoid
interfering with a regular grand jury's civil oversight work. We do
however, strenuously oppose stripping the regular grand jury of its
indictment power, a power which it may wish to use from time to
96. See CGJA NiNETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 4 (2000).
97. See SURVEY, supra note 7.
98. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 19.
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time and which, even if infrequently used, may prove valuable for its
in terrorem effect.
Second, even if one wishes to strip the regular grand jury of its
power to indict, it must be made expressly clear in doing so that the
regular grand jury continues to have the power to diligently "inquire
into... all public offenses .... 99 There is no precedent for
removing the power to investigate crimes from a regular grand jury.
Penal Code sections 904.4 and 904.6 merely require the regular
grand jury to defer indicting, not to defer investigating. Whether a
regular grand jury which has conducted an investigation into what
turns out to be criminal conduct wishes to turn the results of its
investigation over to a district attorney for a proceeding by
information, or to a section 904.6 grand jury for proceeding by
indictment, there is no reason to prevent the regular grand jury from
conducting the investigation. Indeed, there is serious reason not to
create such a limit. Many investigations may begin as mere
oversight inquiries and turn into criminal investigations. It could be
seriously disruptive, and certainly unnecessary, to give defendants
the right to seek to set aside convictions on the grounds that the
process started with an initial civil investigation, which they now
label as a "criminal investigation" undertaken by a grand jury
prohibited from doing so.
Third, it should be made expressly clear that the act of "issuing
an indictment" is not, nor is it analogous to, the act of presenting an
accusation, and that the latter does not require a representative grand
jury.
PENAL CODE SECTION 908.1; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77861-VACANCIES: 10 0 We suggest the third sentence be
modified to read: "No person selected... to fill a vacancy.., shall
vote ... on any criminal matter upon which evidence was taken...
prior to the time of his or her selection." (Emphasis added.) The
hearsay rule does not apply in civil investigations and it is frequently
the case that jurors do not hear a full presentation of "evidence" prior
to the full panel discussion preceding a vote to further an
investigation or issue a report. This is also inconsistent with the
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 911 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
100. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 22.
CAL. GRAND JURY REFORMDEBATE
intent of the staggered term provisions envisioned by Penal Code
sections 908.2 and 77846.
PENAL CODE SECTION 908.2; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77846-STAGGERED TERMS:10 We oppose this provision,
which is carried forward without substantive change from the
existing Penal Code, and urge that it be deleted. A good regular
grand jury is an organism, not unlike an orchestra or sports team. Its
members must, and if the grand jury is successful do, learn to work
closely together, understanding and accommodating the views,
predilections, and prejudices of one another, and creating a milieu in
which disparate strangers from all walks of life can achieve
consensus on difficult issues. It makes no sense to require that that
organism be disrupted constantly so that no functioning unit can
evolve. It is, indeed, an idea one would expect to be advanced by
those opposed to effective grand jury oversight of government.
Although staggered terms are currently provided for on an optional
basis, anecdotal evidence indicates that judges, in their wisdom,
rarely use this potentially disruptive device.
PENAL CODE SECTION 909; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77857--QuALIFIcATIONS: 10 2 See comments to Penal Code
section 893.
PENAL CODE SECTION 911; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77859-OATH: 0 3 Obviously, we have objections to the
creation of the two grand juries that would necessitate the use of two
oaths. That aside, however, and assuming that the regular grand jury
will continue in its present form, with its present powers, the oath
needs serious work. This is another example of the courts and the
grand juries having "muddled along" despite the legislative
inadequacies.
The current oath administered to almost every regular grand
juror in the state will be violated almost instantly by many, if not
most, of those jurors. Further, it does not even address that which
they are in fact pledging to do.
101. See id. at 17.
102. See id. at21.
103. See id.
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The current oath states:
I do solemnly swear (affirm) that I will support the
Constitution of the United States and of the State of
California, and all laws made pursuant to and in conformity
therewith, will diligently inquire into, and true presentment
make, of all public offenses against the people of this state,
committed or triable within this county, of which the grand
jury shall have or can obtain legal evidence. Further, I will
not disclose any evidence brought before the grand jury, nor
anything which I or any other grand juror may say, nor the
manner in which I or any other grand juror may have voted
on any matter before the grand jury. I will keep the charge
that will be given to me by the court.
10 4
Based upon the survey conducted by the CGJA 105 (and
anecdotal evidence received over the years in training programs and
otherwise) virtually all of the grand jurors in the state take that oath
but approximately one-half are told that they are not to investigate
crimes but are solely to function as civil oversight bodies. In other
words, they are specifically told that they must violate their oath and
shall not "diligently inquire into .. all public offenses ... of which
the grand jury ... can obtain legal evidence."' 6 This absurdity is
further heightened when it is recognized that every regular grand jury
impaneled has government oversight responsibilities and is
"inform[ed] and charge[d]" by the court of such "powers, duties, and
responsibilities"' 0 7 but takes no oath to do anything about them.
PENAL CODE SECTION 912; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77860-FOREPERSON: 1° 8 We are aware, anecdotally, that
some courts initially appoint forepersons who are then subject to a
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 911 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
105. See SURVEY, supra note 7; Part IV.
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 911 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001); see supra Part V.
Of course, this oath does reflect and support the proposition that grand jurors
were intended to, and do, have independent power to investigate crimes and
return indictments whether or not a district attorney asks them to do so. The
practicality is that criminal procedure is so fraught with special rules and
technicalities that few grand juries will be able to effectively investigate crimes
and return indictments without the aid of their district attorney. This
demonstrates the weakness in the level of legal advice available to grand juries,
however, not that those who wrote the oath intended it to be a nullity.
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 914.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002).
108. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 22.
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confirming vote by the grand jury after the jurors have gotten to
know one another; others appoint only an interim foreperson and the
jurors elect, or advise the court of their preference regarding, a
permanent foreperson after an appropriate orientation period. Both
practices make sense, but neither is expressly permitted as required
by Daily Journal.'09
PENAL CODE SECTION 914; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTIONS 77881, 77811.5-TRAINING: 10 See Section VI, infra, for a
discussion of CGJA's views regarding the Vitiello/Kelso training
proposal. Section 914(c) needs to be clarified to expressly provide,
consistent with our suggested reconsideration of the Trial Court
Funding Act, who pays for juror training: the courts or the counties.
Given that it is the court, not the county, that "shall ensure" the
training of grand jurors, we think it is appropriate for the courts to
develop minimum training standards for grand jurors,"' most
appropriately as part of the Standards of Judicial Administration.
PENAL CODE SECTION 914.5; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77882-ExPENSES:"12 Although we approve of giving the
court express statutory authority to direct payment of grand jury
expenses by the county to avoid any Daily Journal problems, we
question the source of this authority and, as noted elsewhere, suggest
that the implications of the Trial Court Funding Act and Daily
Journal be fully considered as part of any proposed reform. We
presume that the language "[t]he grand jury shall not spend money or
incur obligations in excess of the amount budgeted for its
investigative activities...." excludes expenses for training for
example.113 If that is not the intent, we suggest the language be
clarified, and if it is the intent, we suggest the statutory purpose
needs rethinking.
PENAL CODE SECTION 915; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77883-COMMENCEMENT: 114 We have no objection to the
proposed statutory text. The comment, however, assumes that
109. See 20 Cal. 4th 1117, 979 P.2d 982 (1999).
110. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 10, 23.
111. CAL. PENAL CODE § 914(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 2002).
112. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 24.
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 914.5 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002).
114. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 24.
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"proceedings are confidential.. ."'" which is an overstatement
given that witnesses are under no obligation of confidentiality.
PENAL CODE SECTIONS 916, 916.1; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT
CODE SECTION 77884-RULES, FOREPERSON: n 6 We would amend
the first sentence to read: "Each grand jury shall choose its officers,
consistent in the case of the foreperson with Government Code
section 77860 (Penal Code section 912)117 topics for inquiry, and
shall determine its rules of proceeding." We question the retention
of a reference to the Penal Code in the second sentence.
PENAL CODE SECTION 917, 918; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTIONS 77945, 77946-PuBLIC OFFENSES: 118  We have no
comment on the language of these provisions, but believe they must,
unequivocally, remain part of the responsibility and authority of the
regular grand jury.
PENAL CODE SECTIONS 919, 920; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTIONS 77892, 77893-PUBLIC PRISON, MALFEASANCE:" 9 We
recognize that the reforms propose only to carry forward the existing
language of sections 919(a)-(c) without change. However, that
language is the source of much confusion and should be clarified if
these proposals go to the legislature.
A significant source of confusion lies in the use of the two
distinct terms "jail" and "prison" in subsections (a) and (b). 120 We
are aware anecdotally that in some counties "jail" in subsection (a) is
interpreted to mean county or city jail, and consequently no
mandatory duty to investigate them as "prisons" attaches pursuant to
subsection (b). In other counties, they are treated as prisons, thus
mandating that they be "inquired into" 121 (but not reported upon)
pursuant to subsection (b).
In some counties, especially where "jails" are treated as
"prisons," it may be that state prisons are viewed as "off-limits"
because they are state, not county agencies. In other counties state
prisons are treated as "prisons." Lastly, there is confusion whether
115. Id.
116. See id. at 24-25.
117. Obviously, as modified per our suggestion in the discussion of those
provisions.
118. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 40-41.
119. See id. at 27-28.
120. CAL. PENAL CODE § 919 (a)-(b) (West 1985).
121. Id.
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juvenile halls and/or California Youth Authority ("CYA") facilities
are either "jails" or "prisons" or neither. Of course, in the case of
county and city jails and juvenile halls (but not CYA facilities) the
issue is only whether the grand jury must "inquire into" them122 or
may "investigate and report on" them.1 23  In the case of CYA
facilities the issue is whether, if they are not prisons pursuant to
section 919(b), there is any authority for the grand jury to investigate
or report on them at all. 
24
A second potential confusion looms on the horizon. Pursuant to
section 919(b), whatever "prison" means, the statute at least means a
"public" prison. We are unaware what the status of private prisons
was when the forerunner of section 919(b) was enacted, but we note
that there is a trend towards privatizing prisons. We suggest that
whether such prisons are to be treated within the meaning of "public
prison" needs clarification. 125 Penal Code section 921 and 77890 use
the same term "public prisons" and should also be clarified.
Section 919(c) invites confusion and debate at best, and gridlock
or violation at worst, in that it requires grand juries to investigate
what could be the subject of numerous, albeit frivolous, complaints
with no indication of the level of information available to the grand
jury sufficient to trigger the requirement. 126 Surely it makes no sense
to impose the obligation of section 919(c) on the grand jury where
willful misconduct or corruption has already been lawfully
determined to have occurred; that would simply be a wasteful
duplication of effort. Conversely, it seems equally wasteful to
require that the grand jury must investigate every complaint,
however scanty, of willful misconduct or corruption that comes to its
attention. In practice, grand juries must be free to determine if they
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 919(b) (West 1985).
123. CAL. PENAL CODE § 925 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
124. For example, in a recent unreported decision, the San Luis Obispo
Superior Court held that a CYA facility in that county was a proper subject for
the grand jury to investigate. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Medical
Records, No. MC 00060 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 14, 2000).
125. One commentator recently said, referring to private prisons in general,
"Private prisons are under no obligation to ensure access to information about
their inmates or how they are classified." Jeffrey A. Lowe, Justice Shouldn't
Be for Sale, Yet Private Prisons Market It, S. F. DAILY J., Nov. 12, 2001, at 4.
Although the statement is undocumented and most probably does not refer to a
grand jury investigation, it highlights a potential future problem.
126. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 919(c) (West 1985).
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have adequate cause to spend their energies investigating willful
misconduct or corruption. The term "shall" should be changed to
"may" to permit this discretion and eliminate what is otherwise the
need to set forth the level of information necessary to trigger the
mandatory obligation.
The language of subsection (c) appears to apply to willful or
corrupt misconduct committed "within the county"'127 by any "public
officer. 1 28  As such, it would appear to reach conduct by state
officials. A frequent question that arises for regular grand juries is
whether they are required (or permitted) by section 919(c) to
investigate judges. Clearly, judges are "public officers" and would
seem to be covered by the statutory language.' 2 9 Notwithstanding
the statutory language, we understand anecdotally that many grand
juries are advised that they cannot investigate the judiciary because
the grand jury is an arm of the court. In consequence, it would be
investigating itself and would appear conflicted if it found no
wrongdoing.
Given the consequences of the Trial Court Funding Act and
Daily Journal discussed in section III, supra, such arm of the court
reasoning is suspect.' 30 We further note that the county in which
such conduct by state officials is most likely to arise is Sacramento
County. The Sacramento County regular grand jury already has the
unique statutory authority to hire a special counsel to "aid the work
127. County grand juries may investigate "lobbying or bribery of state
legislators occurring within [the] county." Samish v. Superior Ct., 28 Cal.
App. 2d 685, 687, 83 P.2d 305, 306 (1938). The Samish decision relied in part
on then Penal Code section 923, the forerunner of present section 919(c),
which then provided: "The grand jury must inquire.., into the willful or
corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of every description within the
county." Id. at 689, 83 P.2d at 307.
128. A public officer is one who exercises a part of the sovereign power of
government. See 52 CAL. JuR. 3D, PUBLIC OFFICERS & EMPLOYEES § 2
(2001).
129. At one time grand juries investigated judges pursuant to Penal Code
section 925. However, this would appear improper now that judges are state
officials. See 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 70, 71 (1993). As noted, however, Penal
Code section 919(c) appears to reach state officials. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
919(c) (West 1985).
130. CGJA does not advocate that regular grand juries affirmatively seek to
investigate the judiciary; we merely note that under the circumstances provided
for by section 919(c) it would appear to be permissible, indeed-given current
language- mandatory, that they do so.
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of the grand jury" but not to duplicate any service which by statute is
"vested within the powers of the district attorney. .... ,,131 Whatever
the district attorney exclusion means, it seems clear that it does not
extend to investigations pursuant to section 919(c). Consequently, at
present, the Sacramento County grand jury would appear to have
special statutory authority to hire special counsel to investigate
willful or corrupt misconduct of state officials occurring within
Sacramento County. 132  However, we observe that the "note"
explaining then statutes 1988, ch. 886, now Penal Code section
936.7, the source of this unique authority, stresses the level of
government services delivered by the county and a "multiplicity of
special taxing districts" in Sacramento County133 as justification for
the special counsel provision. The note, however, fails to mention
the likelihood of willful misconduct or corruption in office occurring
in that county.
It is unclear to what extent any grand jury can investigate willful
or corrupt misconduct by a state official in that jury's county and
whether the Sacramento grand jury can hire special counsel to do so
in a situation such as the Quackenbush scandal. Clarification seems
to be required.
PENAL CODE SECTION 922; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77891-ACCUSATION: 134 We agree with the unchanged
language of Penal Code section 922. We note, however, that section
77953, which purports to provide new and expanded rights to
counsel, would extend those rights to investigations that "may result
in an... accusation... ."135 We strongly object to the extension of
any new right to counsel to such situations inasmuch as the
accusation is not a criminal proceeding. 136 Indeed, we suggest that if
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 936.7 (West Supp. 2002).
132. It would not, however, seem to have the power to bring an accusation
against a state official inasmuch as that power is restricted to actions against
"district, county, or city officers." CAL. PENAL CODE § 922 (West 1985); see
also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3060 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002).
133. Oddly, Sacramento County has but 66 independent special districts
compared, by way of example, to Tulare's 111, San Jouquin's 102 or Fresno or
Kern's 100. See LnTTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, SPECIAL DISTRICTS: RELICS
OF THE PAST OR RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE? 24 (2000).
134. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 27.
135. Id. at 43.
136. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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reform legislation is to be introduced, it include specific provisions
clarifying the accusation's civil status and the procedures for its use.
Grand juries currently have no clear guidance in this regard.
PENAL CODE SECTION 923; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77947-ATToRNEY GENERAL'S GRAND JURY: 137 We have
no comment on the continued language, but disagree with the notion
that it be exclusively contained in proposed Chapter 5, which
purports to create a separate, representative criminal grand jury
which we oppose. We do question, however, the usefulness of this
procedure. We note that, according to press reports, Attorney
General Lockyer is using a grand jury to investigate allegedly illegal
electricity pricing practices. We do not know but assume Vitiello
and Kelso can readily discover whether that grand jury is the regular
grand jury for Sacramento County (which would not be
"representative"), a section 904.6 grand jury (which would be
"representative"), or a section 923 grand jury (which we assume
need not be representative). If the attorney general did not opt for a
section 923 grand jury, we question the value of this provision. If he
did, but impaneled a nonrepresentative grand jury, we suggest that
the decision casts significant doubt on the alleged value of
"representative" grand juries, even when investigating potentially
indictable offenses. 138
PENAL CODE SECTION 924; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77941-DISCLOSURE OF INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION:
13 9
We have no comment on the continued language, but disagree with
the notion that it be exclusively contained in proposed Chapter 5,
which purports to create a separate, representative criminal grand
jury which we oppose.
PENAL CODE SECTIONS 924.1, 924.2, 924.3; PROPOSED
GOVERNMENT CODE SECTIONS 77885, 77886, 77887-SECRECY:
140
We believe current secrecy rules are unduly constraining on the civil
function of grand juries and should be modified. Either witnesses
137. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 47.
138. Although we have not been able to verify this, the Associated Press
reported that the California Attorney General was going to use the regular
nineteen person Sacramento grand jury, presumably not a "representative"
grand jury. See CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July 6, 2001, at A10.
139. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 40-41.
140. See id. at 25-26.
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elsewhere that, although the jurors operate under strict rules of
confidentiality, the officials and agencies they investigate are under
no such constraint. Indeed, even if they were, the restraint might
well prove to be impractical. Frequently, the grand jury meets in the
same facility as those it oversees, where it is readily observable who
is going in and out of the grand jury room. Similarly, a simple
request for documents is sufficient to alert an entire department that
certain aspects of its operations are under review. Finally, as Judge
Kopp noted, the grand jury is severely handicapped in its inability to
explain its actions to the press, or even to respond to the spin-
perhaps outright distortions-of the officials or agencies on which it
reports.
PENAL CODE SECTION 924.6; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77924-TEsTIMoNY DISCLOSURE: 142 We have no comment
on the continued language, but disagree with the notion that it be
exclusively contained in proposed Chapter 5, which purports to
create a separate, representative criminal grand jury which we
oppose.
PENAL CODE SECTION 925; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77894--CouNTY INVESTIGATION: 143 We have no objection
to continuing the existing statutory language. However, we note that
opinions purportedly interpreting that language have been
inconsistent' 44 and we recommend that before the language be re-
suggested to the legislature, an analysis of those opinions be
undertaken to determine whether clarifying the language would
eliminate the possibility for such inconsistencies.
PENAL CODE SECTION 926; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77920-ExPERTs AND ASSISTANTS: 14 5  We have no
objection to the general statutory language. It should, however, be
142. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 34.
143. See id. at 28.
144. Cf 67 Op. Att'y Gen. 519 (1984) (providing that a court marshal is
subject to grand jury audit); 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 70 (1993) (providing that a
grand jury does not have authority to investigate court administrative
operations); Bd. of Tr. of Calavaras Unified Sch. Dist. v. Leach, 258 Cal. App.
2d 281, 65 Cal. Rptr. 588, 592 (1986) (stating that a grand jury cannot
investigate personnel records of school district officials); 78 Op. Att'y Gen.
290 (1995) (stating that a grand jury may investigate how a school district
performs its duties and functions).
145. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 32.
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should be bound by the same standards of confidentiality as jurors, or
the confidentiality strictures applicable to civil oversight
investigations should be carefully relaxed. We agree with Judge
Quentin Kopp, who made the following remarks at the CGJA 2000
Annual Conference:
Now there's a fourth factor that gives me pause about grand
jury, it's based on an innate limitation and that's the secrecy
limitation of a grand jury and a grand jury's work. Now
that has to be counter-balanced in some way by the need to
convey to people what the grand jury has done and to
convey it in a forceful way. I think that is constantly a
problem. A problem of encouraging the media and even
addressing the attention of the media to the product of the
grand jury. And here I assume that it's a good product and
that it's worthwhile, but it's very difficult in my estimation
based upon my twenty seven years or so and now almost
thirty of watching the grand jury process, to draw the
attention of the media in a way which translates into public
opinion. We know that we have no power, literally. We
have the power to formulate findings, we have the power to
formulate recommendations, but our ultimate power is in
persuasion and persuasion is based upon public opinion and
we can't individually do very much so we have to rely on
the media but on the other hand we're circumscribed by that
rule of secrecy. All of which leads me to believe that there
should be a re-examination of some of the finer points, and
I emphasize finer points, of the secrecy provisions of the
law itself... I believe that we should all concentrate on
overcoming those aspects, increasing the visibility of Grand
Juries, increasing the ability to deal with the media, and that
may mean some tinkering with parts of the statutes that are
now in effect, but altogether giving ourselves more
prominence in our respective counties. 
141
We suggest that careful study be made, by a broadly
representative constituency, into the overall issue of the role of
secrecy in grand jury civil oversight investigations. We note
141. CGJA NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 6, 8-9
(2000).
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expanded to include reference to Penal Code section
933.6/Government Code section 77898 (nonprofits), which appear to
have been unintentionally excluded. In addition, the $30,000
limitation is unrealistic today. We suggest increasing that 1974
amount to its present value of $112,500.146 This section, of course,
implicates the Trial Court Funding Act and Daily Journal. See the
discussion regarding them at Section III, supra.
PENAL CODE SECTION 929; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77889-PRIVILEGE AND SECRECY: 147 The language at the
outset of this section "[a]s to any matter not subject to
privilege..."148 raises a question that needs to be addressed.
Presumably, the grand jury is in no position to waive privileges held
by others, though how the grand jury would know the underlying
information in that instance is problematic. Further, most privileges
in California are creations of the Evidence Code and such code is
inapplicable to grand juries. 149 Therefore, there would presumably
not be many, if any, items "subject to privilege" known to the grand
jury as a result of its proceedings. However, the grand jury itself
would be the holder of at least the attorney-client privilege with
respect to advice it had received. As the holder of that privilege it
should be free to waive it. Consequently, we suggest that the quoted
language is potentially overbroad and should be revised as follows:
"As to any matter not subject to a privilege which applies in grand
jury proceedings or, if held by the grand jury, is not waived by
it .... "
There is another issue that arises from time to time, with
inconsistent results, regarding the attorney-client privilege held by
the grand jury. We think it must be clear that the grand jury which
received the privileged advice is free to waive the privilege.
However, the question arises whether a successor grand jury can
waive the privilege which attached to advice given to its predecessor.
By way of analogy, the second grand jury, as the successor in interest
146. According to the Inflation Calculator at http://www.westegg.com/
inflation, the number for 2000 was $112,313.86. At year-end 2001 it will
probably be in excess of $112,500.00.
147. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 26.
148. Id.
149. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 300 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002); El Dorado v.
El Dorado County Grand Jury, No. SC20010006 (Apr. 3,2001).
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to the privilege, should have the unilateral right to waive the
privilege. There is a need for statutory clarity in this regard,
however.
Regardless of the treatment of the privilege issue, we object to
the overbreadth of this section. We are aware of at least one instance
where a grand jury has determined that, because of this section, it
must write its reports in such a way as to avoid actually naming
sources of information who may well be public officials about whom
the public has a right to be informed or who are perfectly willing to
be identified. Protection of whistle-blowers and those who seek
anonymity should be provided for, but not at the expense of
rendering grand jury reports sterile and internally indefensible.
PENAL CODE SECTION 931; No PROPOSED REFORM SECTION-
PAYMENT OF EXPENSES: See comments to Penal Code section 890.1.
PENAL CODE SECTION 932; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODES
SECTION 77930-REcOVER MONEY DUE: 150 We suggest that the
term "district attorney" be replaced with the term "county counsel"
both times "district attorney" appears. Recovery of monies owed is a
civil litigation function better suited to the skills of county counsel.
If there are any counties left that do not have county counsel we
suggest that the term "district attorney" be replaced with the term
"county counsel or, if there is no county counsel, the district
attorney."
PENAL CODE SECTION 933; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77932-FINAL REPORT: 15 1 This statute has some imprecise
language that needs to be made more precise. The first sentence of
subsection (a) implies that all grand juries issue "final reports" and
that there is only one final report.152 First, section 904.6 grand juries
do not (and, if the ill-conceived section 77940 grand jury is
established, it may not) issue final reports. Second, as the second
sentence recognizes, there may be multiple final reports issued
during a grand jury's term and, indeed, the release of multiple final
reports throughout the course of a grand jury's term is becoming the
norm. 53 The first sentence should be revised to read: "Each regular
150. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 36.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. See SURVEY, supra, note 7.
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grand jury shall submit to the presiding judge of the superior court
one or more final reports .... "
Subsection (a) also leaves unclear that it is the grand jury's
determination whether and when to submit a final report for
comment before its public release. A new fourth sentence should be
inserted to read: "The grand jury, in its discretion, shall determine
when, after the presiding judge has determined that it is in
compliance with this title, a final report shall be publicly released,
and whether and when to submit such a report for comment prior to
public release."
Many grand juries would like to discuss the recommendations in
their final reports with officials and agencies in advance of release,
but are deterred from doing so by the fact that the jurors, but not the
officials or agencies, are required to keep the contents of the
unreleased report confidential. Therefore, a new fourth sentence,
consistent with the last sentence of Penal Code 933.05 (see 77932(c)
below), should be added to read:
No officer, agency, department, or governing body of a
public agency or employee or agent thereof shall disclose or
comment upon the contents of the report prior to the public
release of the final report. Disclosure in violation of this
section shall constitute 'willful misconduct in office'
pursuant to Penal Code section 919(c).
Subsection (b) needs to be clarified, consistent with the above,
to avoid public filing of an unreleased report or the unnecessary
delay in filing responses, which need not be "found in compliance"
at all. The first sentence should be modified to read: "One copy of
each final report, found to be in compliance with this title and
publicly released by the grand jury, and the responses thereto, shall
be placed on file.. .. "
Subsection (c) needs clarification as to who has responsibility
for assuring timely and proper responses are received. The section
provides that responses, in the form of "comments," are to be made
"to the presiding judge."'154 It is unclear, however, what the
presiding judge is to do about them. Indeed, consistent with Daily
Journal it is unclear if he/she has authority to do anything about
154. Id. at 37.
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them. 155 According to the CGJA survey, in 48% of the counties, the
presiding judge follows up in at least those situations where no
timely response is submitted. 156 We believe many presiding judges
view themselves as having no role with regard to responses, and
many others do not get the responses that are received for statutory
compliance. Subsection (c) also needs the addition of a new last
sentence as follows: "No officer, agency, department, or governing
body of a public agency or employee or agent thereof shall disclose
or comment upon the contents of the report prior to the public release
of the final report. Disclosure in violation of this section shall
constitute 'willful misconduct in office' pursuant to Penal Code
section 919(c)."
Lastly, subsection (d) needs clarification of the language
"elected county officer or agency head."'157 Specifically, it is unclear
whether "elected" modifies only "county officer" or "agency head"
as well.'58
PENAL CODE SECTION 933.05(e); PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77914(b)-RESPONSES TO FINDINGS:' 59 The requirement
that, during an investigation, the grand jury meet with "the subject"
of the investigation needs clarification. Often the subject may be a
body, such as a board of supervisors, or an agency, such as the Public
Works Department. With whom is the grand jury to meet in those
circumstances?
PENAL CODE SECTION 933.5; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77897-SPECIAL DISTRICTS: 16 0 We can find no definition
for the term "special-purpose assessing or taxing district ' 161 and
believe it needs to be defined. Based upon anecdotal information,
we believe most independent special districts and grand juries
believe the term includes all independent special districts, whether
enterprise or nonenterprise. It is less clear whether there is
consensus if dependent special districts, of any type, are included.
We also note that there are some special districts in the state which
155. See Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 4th 1117,
979 P.2d 982, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 623 (1999).
156. See SURVEY, supra note 7, at 2.
157. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 37.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 32.
160. See id. at 29.
161. Id.
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have no apparent function. 162 We suggest that language similar to
that of sections 925(a) and 928 be included as the last sentence of
section 933.5 as follows: "The grand jury may investigate and report
upon the needs of all special districts wholly or partly within the
county, including the abolition or creation of special districts, and the
equipment for, or the method or system of performing the duties of,
the several special districts."
PENAL CODE SECTIONS 934,935; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTIONS 77921, 77922-RIGHT TO SEEK ADVICE: 163 These two
sections should be clarified so that it is clear that unless the district
attorney is presenting evidence in a criminal proceeding for the
purpose of seeking an indictment, the district attorney may be
present during sessions of the regular grand jury only when his/her
advice is requested by the regular grand jury.
PENAL CODE SECTION 936.5; No PROPOSED REFORM SECTION-
EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL AND INVESTIGATORS: This
section has a number of problems. First, according to the statutory
language, special counsel cannot be appointed unless the court
determines, after an evidentiary hearing, that all of the district
attorneys, the county counsel, and the attorney general have conflicts
that prevent them from acting.164 As a practical matter, the attorney
general has no interest in, or expertise with respect to, grand jury
civil oversight matters and cannot reasonably be expected to be a
viable alternate source of counsel, even if wholly free of any possible
conflict. Second, the requirement of an evidentiary hearing, the
possibility of appeal, and the fact that the order appointing
independent counsel is stayed pending such an appeal makes this an
unworkable prospect for a regular grand jury limited by its one-year
term. Third, the provision that no special counsel can be appointed
absent a certification that the county has the funds to pay such
counsel, unless the board of supervisors or a member is under
investigation,165 invites treatment of the board of supervisors or a
member as a subject of investigation who might otherwise not be.
162. See LIrLE HOOVER COMMISSION, SPECIAL DISTRICTS: RELICS OF THE
PAST OR RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE? at i.
163. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 33.
164. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 936.5(b) (West 1985).
165. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 936.5(c) (West 1985).
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Anecdotally, we understand that, despite the strictures of section
936.5, in counties where it appears to the court that the county
counsel and district attorney have conflicts, the court will authorize
retention of independent counsel by the grand jury, subject to court
supervision of fees.
Here again there exists a situation where, when the system
works, it works in contravention of the limitations of Daily
Journal.166 The entire subject of independent counsel for grand
juries needs to be re-thought. Grand juries may need independent
counsel in two, quite different, circumstances.
First, for many grand juries, county counsel is their primary
legal advisor. 167 County counsel of course represents many, perhaps
most, of the officials and agencies the grand jury wishes to
investigate. Some counsel proceed, despite the conflict, to the
obvious potential detriment of the grand jury. Others are quite
willing to recuse themselves, but that often leaves the grand jury to
seek advice from a district attorney who has no skills in agency law
and a full plate of other matters for which he/she is statutorily
responsible. Supervising judges are often willing to serve as
advisors, but they have their own trial calendars and may not be the
most accessible advisors. The attorney general is simply not in the
business of providing advice to grand juries conducting the civil
oversight function. There needs to be a simple procedure, not unlike
that currently followed by sympathetic judges-but unauthorized by
the legislature and therefore suspect under Daily Journal168-which
permits a grand jury, on short notice, to request, and the supervising
judge to authorize, retention of outside, independent legal counsel to
assist in civil matters where cause is shown.
Second, occasionally a grand jury's conduct is the subject of
litigation-litigation which frequently gives rise to interpretations
and rules which affect all California grand juries. It is possible for
such litigation to occur without the participation of the affected grand
jury. It is virtually certain that it will occur without the participation
166. See Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal.4th at 1117, 979 P.2d
982, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623 (1999).
167. According to the CGJA survey this is the case for 42% of California
grand juries. See supra, Section IV.E.
168. See Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal.4th at 1117, 979 P.2d
982, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623 (1999).
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of anyone representing the interests of grand juries in general. One
consequence is the development of impractical, unrealistic court
decisions of the type that may necessitate legislative reform from
time to time.
If a consequence of the Trial Court Funding Act and Daily
Journal is that the courts must treat grand juries as "unallowed" and
shall have no inherent authority with respect to them, the grand juries
will be in desperate need of independent legal advice. Otherwise
they will be forced always to seek support from the very bodies they
are charged to investigate. The unfortunate outcome of that
circumstance is predictable. Presently, grand juries are still getting
covert help from the courts, but such help cannot be predicted to
continue. We suggest that the subject of making independent advice
available to grand juries is one worthy of a study and analysis by the
many constituents who will be affected by the outcome.
PENAL CODE SECTION 938.4; PROPOSED GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 77814-MEETING ROOM AND OTHER SUPPORT:"'69 This is
another example of the problems caused by the Trial Court Funding
Act and Daily Journal. Current law is unclear as to who is to pay for
a "suitable meeting room and other support as the court determines is
necessary for the grand jury."'170 If grand juries are no longer part of
court operations, it is difficult to see how the court will pay for them.
But, if the court is not paying, why should it decide what is
"suitable"? The concept that the court be authorized to direct the
county to pay at least gives the court statutory authority to become
involved, thus avoiding the Daily Journal problem, but we wonder
how counties will like such a suggestion.
GOVERNMENT CODE SECTIONS 77940 THROUGH AND INCLUDING
77973; PENAL CODE SECTIONS 904.6, 917, 917.8, 923, 924, 924.6,
938, 938.1, 938.2, 938.3, 939, 939.2, 939.21, 939.3, 939.5, 939.6,
939.7, 939.71, 939.8, 939.91, 940, 943, 944, 945, AND AB 527.
Generally, matters of criminal authority and procedure are not within
the purview or expertise of the CGJA. We therefore make no
specific comments on these statutes except, as noted elsewhere,
where they may implicate civil functions. We, along with other
commentators, do of course strongly object to the attempted
169. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 12.
170. CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.4 (West 2002).
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bifurcation of grand jury powers between civil and criminal, and we
discuss those broad objections in our discussion of Penal Code
sections 904.4 and 904.6, above.
VI. TRAINING FOR GRAND JURORS
One of the prime purposes of the CGJA is to promote
comprehensive training and orientation of all new jurors throughout
the state. Indeed, some CGJA members have been actively
conducting training as individuals, as well as for the organization, for
more than the past decade. 171 Previously, when the legislature was
considering changes to the Penal Code, representatives of CGJA
testified before legislative committees regarding the need for training
of county grand jurors. We were pleased to see the advances made
by the passage of Penal Code section 914(b) and welcome efforts to
improve the quality of training and to provide the funding to make it
available to all grand jurors statewide.
Our analysis of the Vitiello/Kelso reform proposals regarding
grand juror training produced agreement in some areas, but also
raised some concerns and many unanswered questions in the areas of
cost, scope, and the proposed pilot project.
We agree the teaching method of hands-on exercises utilizing
simulation could be effective. The main drawback is that it takes
much more time, which equates to much higher costs.
Projected costs of the proposed training program are projected at
$1,000 per juror, which is unrealistic. 172  Assuming the
recommendation contemplates centralized training, it would be at
least $1,500 to $2,000 per juror when the costs for lodging, meals,
and travel expenses are added. Multiplied by 1100 grand jurors
statewide this comes to $2,200,000 each year. The Vitiello/Kelso
report states, "[i]t is unlikely that very many counties could afford
the expense of this type of program."' 173 We agree that they cannot.
The reform proposal "suggests the possibility of state funding
for grand juror training."'174 It is a possibility, but is it realistic that
the state (especially with projected budget shortfalls) would take that
171. The three primary authors of this section have been training grand
jurors for 13, 11 and 10 years, respectively.
172. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 7.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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on? Exactly how would funding be provided? Would it be
mandated and automatically provided every year or would it be
discretionary funding that may be available some years but not other
years? How can it be assured that state funding will not come with
"strings attached" that may be detrimental to grand jury operations or
independence?
The scope of the training program, as stated on page 7, "would
train grand jurors to conduct interviews, examine witnesses and write
reports,"'175 which differs from the Penal Code section 914 wording
of "training that addresses, at a minimum, report writing, interviews,
and the scope of the grand jury's responsibility and statutory
authority."'176 Grand jury responsibility and statutory authority must
be included. We also wonder why the training proposal does not
include the topic of how to plan and conduct a grand jury
investigation. Why is just interviewing included when it is only one
of several methods used by grand juries in conducting
investigations?
The proposed scope of instruction seems incomplete and very
limited. In addition to report writing, interviews, investigations, and
the scope of the grand jury's responsibility and statutory authority,
there are many other topics that are essential to a comprehensive
training program. These topics include: organization and internal
operating practices of a grand jury; juror conduct, obligations, and
ethics; how to research and verify information as factual; continuity
and follow-up to final reports; interrelationships with legal advisors
and outside experts; understanding the authority, organization, and
functions of various local government agencies, as well as the role of
public officials and governing boards; laws common to all public
agencies such as the Brown Act, 177 California Public Records Act,
178
Political Reform Act of 1974,179 and conflict of interest law; and how
to handle citizen complaints.
The proposed pilot project for grand juror training would
encompass developing a civil grand jury curriculum, offering one-
time, free training to a limited number of grand jurors based on this
175. Id.
176. CAL. PENAL CODE § 914 (b) (West Supp. 2002).
177. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-54962 (West 1997).
178. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 6250-6268 (West 1995).
179. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 81000-81016 (West 1993).
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curriculum, and then evaluating the curriculum and training program
at an estimated cost of $300,000.18 Our questions are:
1. Developing a civil grand jury curriculum. We believe that
the subject matter of the curriculum is just as important as the
teaching methodology used and wonder:
a. Does the Department of Justice, Vitiello, Kelso, or
any of California's law schools have a thorough
understanding of the functions and operations of
regular grand juries? Would they seek input from
experienced grand jurors and if so, how?
b. If funding is made available, will other
organizations of professional training providers be
considered?
c. We note that no law school curriculum lists any
course work regarding the California regular
grand jury. Might it not be appropriate for judges,
district attorneys, county counsels, court executive
officers, and former grand jurors to develop some
training for law schools themselves, so their
graduates will be able to assist grand juries in
conducting their essential civil oversight role?
2. One-time, free training will be offered to no more than 250
new grand jurors between January 1, 2003 and December 31,
2003, followed by an evaluation and a written report to the
legislature by July 1, 2004.181
a. Most one-week programs provide training to
employees who have a financial and professional
stake in attending. Often the training is mandated
by their employers. Most grand jurors are
basically volunteers who serve only for one year.
They may not have the incentive to spend a week
in concentrated training.
b. Many grand jurors are employed and their juries
meet in the evening. Some employed jurors have
a problem attending even CGJA's two-day
seminars. How could they attend a five-day
180. See Tentative Recommendation, supra note 34, at 7.
181. See id.
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program? How can the program be evaluated
properly if it excludes such grand jurors, who will
in any event be part of the population that serves
on grand juries?
3. Evaluation of the efficacy of providing substantial training.
a. How do you determine "effectiveness" in a grand
jury? If you are planning to compare seemingly
identical counties, one of which gets this training
and one does not, you need to establish how to
measure effectiveness. The issues any grand jury
has to deal with are largely situational-what is
currently happening in a county. Many highly
effective reports depended on a particular situation
that came to the attention of the grand jury.
Regardless of how similar two counties may be,
that they might have similar and simultaneous
happenings is unlikely. Of course, this also
presupposes two other things: that it is possible to
match county grand juries adequately and that
each of these counties would be able to recruit
similar jurors.
b. Who is to perform the evaluation? Will they be
independent from those that design and implement
the program so there would be no vested interest
in what the results are? How can one ensure that
the results of the proposed pilot program are
"evaluated" with reference to meaningful
standards?
C. For evaluation purposes, how will a "comparable"
county that did not receive training be found?
CGJA's 2001 Grand Jury Practices Survey shows
that 98% of the responding counties receive
training.182 Would those counties selected for the
"comparable" group have to forego their normal
training that year? Would this be a violation of
182. See SURVEY, supra note 7.
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Penal Code section 914(b) that mandates grand
jurors receive training?1
8 3
4. There is no mention of any plan as to how the pilot project
could be turned into a statewide training program. Should
there not be at least a tentative plan for continuation and
expansion? If this is likely to be only a one-time training
effort, we think grand juries would be better served to use the
$300,000 for durable, ongoing teaching materials such as
training videos available to all juries.
The issue of training is so critical to the success of any jury that
we feel it is necessary to have an additional study by a variety of
former jurors of varying types of expertise, as well as other
professionals such as presiding judges, district attorneys, and county
counsels-practitioners rather than academics. We believe that only
someone who has actually served on a jury can grasp the range of
subject matter essential to carry on investigations, form consensus,
write good reports, and make proper recommendations. Many
former jurors are attorneys, teachers, university professors, police
and professional investigators, accountants, management auditors,
and others who have professional skills that can be used to establish
training essentials and methods. Indeed, people with these skills are
used by CGJA in its training programs as part of the training team
and as presenters at seminars. We think their views should be
included in any consideration of grand juror training. We also note
that the Administrative Office of the Courts has professional trainers
on its staff and we believe their views should be included as well.
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR STATUTORY ADDITIONS
Hopefully it is abundantly clear by now that CGJA does not
support the introduction of broad reform legislation of the type
proposed by Vitiello/Kelso, or indeed, given the vagaries of the
legislative process, of any type of reform except the most narrow and
specific proposals which have broad understanding and support. If,
however, a broad reform package is to be introduced, we urge that it
include statutory proposals designed to address the following areas
which we know to be of recurrent concern to grand juries:
183. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 914(b) (West 2002).
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a. Better access to independent counsel, both to advise grand
juries during the course of their terms and to represent them
in judicial proceedings where the interests of a grand jury, or
all grand juries, are at stake. Current access to independent
counsel is overly restrictive and forces grand juries to rely for
their advice on counsel with conflicts of interest or no
concern for the grand jury and its interests.' 84 Occasionally,
grand juries must go to court and there is no current provision
designed to permit them to retain litigation counsel. A recent
ruling from the Superior Court, not appealed, granting the
grand jury access to material that the county was improperly
withholding, was possible only because a member of the
grand jury panel was a skilled litigation practitioner and
represented the grand jury pro bono. ts5 In addition, it is
possible for issues of importance to grand juries to be
litigated without any grand jury, or spokesperson for the
rights and interests of grand juries in general, being a party to
the litigation.18 6 Legislation should provide for the retention
of independent counsel, either by the directly affected grand
jury or by the court as amici,187 if grand jury interests are to
be adjudicated in the absence of any party representing those
interests.
b. Legislation should ensure that grand juries have access to
current technology. As our survey reveals, grand jury access
to even everyday technology varies widely.' 88 We recognize
that the ability of counties to provide technology will vary
184. See discussion of Penal Code section 936.5, supra notes 164-68 and
accompanying text.
185. See El Dorado v. El Dorado County Grand Jury, No. SC20010006 (Apr.
3, 2001).
186. Thus, for example, in the seminal Fitts case, 4 Cal. 2d 514, 51 P.2d 66
(1935), the fundamental attributes of the grand jury were debated, and issues of
alleged grand jury impropriety and the use of the accusation procedure were
resolved. However, the grand jury was not a party to the action, nor were
grand jury interests represented by any amici. This is a case that made it to the
California Supreme Court. It seems likely that in many unreported cases
resolved at the trial court level, grand jury interests are similarly unrepresented.
187. See, e.g., McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1162, 751
P.2d 1329, 245 Cal. Rptr. 2d 774 (1988) (where the Fresno County grand jury
was represented by amici).
188. See SURVEY, supra note 7.
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considerably, so we suggest that legislation simply require
that the grand jury be provided with whatever technology is
made available to county employees.
c. Consistent with our discussion of the confidentiality
provisions of the Penal Code and Judge Kopp's remarks
quoted above, we think existing confidentiality statutes need
rethinking and replacement with a new, more coherent
confidentiality policy with regard to the civil oversight
function of the grand jury. We currently take no position as
to which is better, but we think a choice needs to be made
between complete confidentiality, including witnesses and
government personnel on the one hand, or relaxed
confidentiality as it applies to grand jurors on the other. The
current situation where jurors are pledged to the utmost
secrecy while witnesses and government personnel are free to
talk among themselves, to potential witnesses, and to the
media is simply wrong.
18 9
d. Consistent with our discussion of training in Section VI, we
believe that minimum training standards should be developed
to assist courts in meeting their responsibility under Penal
Code section 914 to ensure grand juror training. This, it
seems to us, is ideally a function for the Administrative
Office of the Courts, as it clearly is an inappropriate role for
the legislature.
e. There is need for a comprehensive analysis of the role
"Implementation Review Committees" can play in ensuring
proper follow-up on responses to reports where the agency or
official has agreed to implement suggested changes. We
understand that such bodies exist, in somewhat different
forms, in Orange and San Diego Counties and that their
function in each is to inquire into the status of promised
implementation and to report their findings to the Boards of
189. By way of example only, see Chuck Finnie & Julian Guthrie, Grand
Investigating S.F. Schools, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 2001, at A21, which
reported on the commencement of a federal grand jury investigation of the
city's schools. We wonder if simple publicity of that sort does not bring out
the complaints and the whistle-blowers and make the grand jury's job much
easier. Currently, that type of public notification and outreach is prohibited to
California grand juries.
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Supervisors for such follow up action as the Boards may
desire to take. We believe the function of Implementation
Review Committees, and their possible desirability for all
counties, cities and special districts is a fit subject for analysis
by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The dual function regular grand jury has been a part of
California's system of governance since the state's inception. It has
a long, honorable and valuable history. It has functioned remarkably
well over the decades, allowing generations of citizens to exercise
their retained rights to oversee their governments. It has functioned
credibly with little legislative attention and remarkably simple, if
imprecise, statutory guidelines. It has been able to do so largely
because it has been an arm of the court, able to operate wholly
independent of the courts, yet able as well to seek their guidance and
protection from hostile officials. The Trial Court Funding Act and
Daily Journal decision have put all of that at risk. Whether
legislative changes will be required as a result, and what they may
be, remains to be determined. What is clear at the moment is that no
legislation should be introduced until all affected persons and entities
have had ample time to consider, analyze, debate, and form
consensus as to what such legislation, if any, should be. For starters
the CGJA believes that there should be consideration of undoing the
potentially harmful effects of the Trial Court Funding Act and Daily
Journal. Only when it is known whether the regular grand jury will
return to its status as an arm of the court does it make sense to even
contemplate legislation relating to how it operates. There are a large
number of vitally affected interests which must be heard before any
legislative risk is run by the introduction of one or more bills. We
urge that the Judicial Council is the agency best equipped to host and
oversee the effort to bring the different interests together and assist
them in reaching consensus. The CGJA stands ready to offer its
expertise and services in that regard so that the institution to which
we are dedicated is wisely preserved.
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